The group, upon the issuance of its first press release on December 21, 1957, designated itself a "Committee of Investigation".
In the course of its inquiry, it took testimony from only seven witnesses.
It heard Bang-Jensen twice and his lawyer, Adolf A. Berle, Jr., once.

Its second press release was on January 15, 1958, and it recommended that the secret papers be destroyed.
It also implied that Paul Bang-Jensen had been irresponsible.

On January 18, Ernest Gross conducted a press conference at the U.N. lasting an hour.
Here, he openly attacked Bang-Jensen and referred to his "aberrant conduct".
This conference was held despite Stavropoulos' assurance to Adolf Berle, who was leaving the same day for Puerto Rico, that nothing would be done until his return on January 22, except that the Secretary General would probably order the list destroyed.

On January 24 Paul Bang-Jensen, accompanied by Adolf Berle, was met by Dragoslav Protitch and Colonel Frank Begley, former Police Chief of Farmington, Conn., and now head of U.N. special police.

The four, bundled in overcoats, mounted to the wind-swept roof of the U.N.

There, Begley lit a fire in a wire basket, and Bang-Jensen dropped four sealed envelopes into the flames.
In one of these he said were notes on the identities of the eighty-one refugees.

The method of destroying the evidence embarrassed Paul Bang-Jensen.
He knew it would be implied that it was done in this way at his insistence.
He was right, and Peter Marshall could not help but recall Andrew Cordier's words on the subject, "Well, it seemed as good a place as any to do the job".

The Gross group had been formed for the express purpose of advising the Secretary General.
Hammarskjold's supposed desire to seek outside legal advice in the guise of Ernest Gross is illusion, at best.
Gross's, being "outside" the U.N. applied only to a physical state, not an objective one.
But by the time the papers were finally disposed of, the group had informed the world of its purpose, its recommendations, and its belief that Paul Bang-Jensen was not of sound mind.

Shortly the group would issue its report to the Secretary General, recommending Paul Bang-Jensen's dismissal from the United Nations.
The contents of this 195-page document would become known to many before it would become known to the man it was written about.

"Until this Hungarian Committee matter came up, Bang-Jensen was a fine and devoted individual.
I had known him for some years, when I was a delegate and before, and this manner had never been his".

Ernest A. Gross leaned back in his chair and told Peter Marshall how Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold had, on December 4, 1957, called him in as a private lawyer to review Bang-Jensen's conduct "relating to his association with the Special Committee on the problem of Hungary".
The result was the "Gross Report", prepared by Gross, as chairman, with the assistance of two U.N. Under Secretaries, Constantin Stavropoulos and Philippe De Seynes.

"Yes", Gross went on, "Bang-Jensen was an up-and-coming young man.
He had always done well.
Never well known, but he had done his work competently."

Gross had received Marshall courteously and they were discussing the case.
"You know", the lawyer said, "it's difficult to talk like this about a man who can't answer back".

Gross was behind a clean-top desk, only a manila folder before him.
Marshall sat in one of the several leather chairs.
Outside the office windows, twenty-four stories above Wall Street, a light rain was falling.

"Mr. Gross, your report says that 'our function is investigative and advisory and does not in any way derogate from or prejudice Mr. Bang-Jensen's rights as a staff member'.
You know, Bang-Jensen characterized your Committee as having prejudged his case".

Gross swung his swivel chair.
"Well, how could that have been?
I don't consider that he was prejudged.
We were given a job and we carried it out, and later, his case was taken up by the Disciplinary Committee.

"We have nothing to hide under a bushel.
We did our job, Mr. Stavropoulos and Mr. De Seynes and myself, taking evidence from a number of people".

"What did you think about his mental state"?

"I think our report sums up our finding", Gross answered.
"Don't forget, here was a man who had been accusing his colleagues for almost a year of willfully attempting to present an incorrect report.

"This was not merely alleging errors, but was carried out by day-after-day allegations in memos, written charges of serious consequence.

"This is a distressing thing.
Supposing you or I were being accused in this manner, and yet we were doing our level best to carry on our work.
No organization can carry on like that.

"I've been in government and I can tell some pretty hairy stories about personnel difficulties, so I know what a problem he was".

"What I'd like you to comment on is the criticism leveled at your Committee".

"What do you mean"?

"For instance, regarding the fact that the Gross Committee issued two interim announcements to the press during its investigation.
You know Bang-Jensen was told the Committee was 'to convey its views, suggestions and recommendations to the Secretary General'.
In his own words, Bang-Jensen 'took it for granted that the Group would report to the Secretary General privately and not in public'.
He claimed that the release of the preliminary findings was 'prejudicial to his position'".

Gross bristled.
For an instant he glared speechless at Marshall.
"Listen", he said.
"I thought the entire report was going to be confidential from beginning to end.
But you know Bang-Jensen launched an active campaign against us in the press.
It was getting so that we, the Committee, were being tried.
You can find it in the papers".

"Well, as a matter of fact, I've looked through back-issue files of New York papers for December, 1957, and haven't found a great deal" --

Gross shot another look at Marshall.
"It wasn't necessarily all here in New York.
Don't forget the foreign press".

"Then what about the second interim public announcement?
This cited Bang-Jensen's 'aberrant conduct'".

"The reason for that report was to settle the matter of the list.
As far as I'm concerned, it was a separate matter from the general Committee study of Bang-Jensen's conduct.
The January fifteen report recommended that Bang-Jensen be instructed to burn the list -- the papers -- in the presence of a U.N. Security Officer".

"How about your press conference three days later -- what was the reason for that?
Bang-Jensen said you told correspondents that you had checked in advance to make sure the term 'aberrant conduct' was not libelous.
He claimed you made other slanderous allegations".

Gross paused and repeated himself.
"The entire object of the press conference was to clarify the problem of the list, since many in the press were querying the U.N. about it.
What was the list?
I don't know.
Bang-Jensen never explained what the documents or papers were that he had in his possession.

"It was foolish of him to keep them, whatever they were.
He could have been blackmailed, or his family might have been threatened.
Of course the matter caught the public's attention.
We attempted to conclude this, and did so by having the papers burned.

Hammarskjold didn't like the way it was carried out.
It was a sort of Gotterdammerung affair.
Hammarskjold believes the U.N. is an organization that settles matters in a procedural way."

Peter Marshall reflected.
If Hammarskjold had not wanted the list disposed of in this manner, and if Bang-Jensen had not wanted it -- who had ordered it?

"Mr. Gross, concerning the formation of your Committee, there's the fact that you have been a legal adviser to the U.N. in the past;
as I understand it, Mr. Hammarskjold wanted outside advice.
Could you comment on that"?

"I've served as a counsel for the U.N. for some years, specializing particularly in real estate matters or other problems that the regular U.N. legal staff might not be equipped to handle.
Mr. Stavropoulos is the U.N. legal chief and a very good man, but he is not fully versed on some technical points of American law".

"What did you think about Bang-Jensen's contention of errors and omissions in the Hungarian report"?
Marshall asked.

"Those"!
Gross answered.
"Why, Mick Shann went over and over the report with Alsing Andersen, trying to check them out.
Even after the incident between Bang-Jensen and Shann in the Delegates' Lounge and this was not the way the Chicago Tribune presented it".

Gross reached in his desk and pulled out two newspaper clippings.
One was an article on the U.N. by Alice Widener from the Cincinnati Enquirer.
The other was by Chesly Manley in the Chicago Daily Tribune.

Gross pointed to the Manley story.
"I know Ches, he's a friend of mine.
He probably didn't mean to write it this way, or maybe he did.
There wasn't any 'violent argument' between Bang-Jensen and Shann, as the Tribune puts it.
That implies that Shann was on the enemy side.
You see what I mean?
How it's phrased there -- the word violent.

"The case was that Bang-Jensen came up to Shann claiming he had found further errors in the report.
'I've found errors and I want you to look them over'.
So once again Shann had to argue with him about this.
But it wasn't a violent discussion.
And after all this, Shann went over all that Bang-Jensen had brought up".

(Shann's own report, Peter Marshall reflected, describes the encounter as "immoderate".
Bang-Jensen was in "hysterical condition".
)

Gross stopped briefly, then went on.
"Shann was responsible for the report.
He has felt terrible about all this.
It was a good report, he did all he could to make it a good report.
When I speak of how Shann felt, I know well.
Don't forget, I am an old member of the club, a former delegate.
I think you are being unfair to take these things up now.

"You know, this hits in many areas.
It appeals to those who were frustrated in the outcome of the Hungarian situation.
Don't forget, the U.N. did no more than the United States did.
It takes a great deal of sophisticated thought to get the impact of this fact".

Chapter 22
from the home of his friend, Henrik Kauffmann, in Washington, D.C., Paul Bang-Jensen sent a telegram dated December 9, 1957, to Ernest Gross.
It said in part:

"the matters to be considered are obviously of a grave character, and I therefore respectfully request that the hearing be postponed for two weeks in order that I might make adequate preparation".

Ernest Gross replied the next day, putting the suspended diplomat's fears to rest.
"This reveals some misunderstanding on your part.
The group conducting the review is not holding formal hearings.
It wished to pursue, in the course of this review, questions arising from the body of material already in its possession."

It sounded like a fair enough invitation, Peter Marshall reflected, and Bang-Jensen must have thought so too, because on the thirteenth, he met the group of three on the thirty-sixth floor of the U.N.
There, Ernest Gross further assured him:

"We were requested by the Secretary General, as I understand it, to discuss with you such matters as appear to us to be relevant, and we are not of course either a formal group or a committee in the sense of being guided by any rules or regulations of the Secretariat.
The only rules which I think we shall follow will be those of common sense, justice, and fairness".

Peter Marshall noted that Bang-Jensen had later referred to his two interviews with the Gross group as "unfortunate experiences", and after his second meeting on the sixteenth the Dane refused to attend further hearings without legal counsel.
Marshall pondered the reason for this, and pondered too the replacement of one member of the three-man group.

J. A. C. Robertson, after serving Gross one week, left for England.